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For most of us, the collapse of the World Trade Center towers exists at
the outermost edge of human comprehension. Even after one visits Ground
Zero, the events of 9/11 retain a surreal quality, invoking feelings beyond
words as one tries to contemplate losses immeasurable with numbers.
Indeed, the insurance losses are insignificant when compared to the human
tragedies caused by the terrorist attacks-and in insurance terms, we
witnessed the most costly, complex events to transpire in a single day in the
history of the planet.' Many years will pass before all the insurance
ramifications of 9/11 are sorted out.
" Floyd R. Gibson Missouri Endowed Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia
School of Law. Professor Jerry expresses his appreciation to Bruce Nguyen and Michele
Mekel for their extremely helpful research assistance and to the trust of the Gibson Missouri
Endowed Professorship for its support of this project,
1. A year after 9/11, estimates of insured losses continue to vary widely. Standard &
Poor's figure is $30 billion, A.M. Best Co. projects losses of $30 to $40 billion, the
Insurance Information Institute projects $40.2 billion, consulting firm A.T. Kearney projects
losses of more than $50 billion, and Tillinghast-Towers Perrin predicts losses somewhere
between $30 and $58 billion. Mark A. Hofmann & Meg Fletcher, Loss Picture Still
Unclear, Bus. INs., Sept. 9, 2002, at 5-8, 18. The figure will probably not be known for
years, and it may ultimately prove to be higher than all of these estimates. Economic loss in
New York City is estimated at $83 billion and may eventually reach $95 billion, according
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Unquestionably, the boundary between the unimaginable and the
possible changed on 9/11. Thus, it is counterintuitive to suggest that the
world on September 12th-and the insurance world in particular-was not
hugely different than the world that existed on September 10th. Of course,
it cannot be seriously asserted that little changed on September 11 th; such a
statement would be incredibly absurd and hugely insensitive to the
thousands of people whose lives were altered or destroyed by the events in
New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania. But close examination of the
insurance ramifications of 9/11 suggests that not as much has changed as
many observers claim. If this is so, we should expect minimal long-run
dislocations in insurance markets, and we should therefore resist drastic
governmental responses that are disproportionate to the specific capacity
problems that 9/11 created. To explore this assertion more closely, this
article examines three questions that illuminate at least a portion of 9/1 I's
meaning for the business of insurance in America and around the globe:2
(1) Is the post-9/1 1 world different from the pre-9/11 world? (2) Is the post-
to a report released on September 4, 2002 by the New York City Controller. William
Sherman, Terror Cost City 83B Controller's Report Says Tab Could Rise, N.Y. DAILY
NEWS, Sept. 5, 2002, at 9. It is anticipated that liability and business interruption policies
will account for most of the losses (590/6), whereas property damage policies will pay about
one-fifth of the total loss, and that "60 to 80 percent of the insurance payments for the 9/11
attacks will ultimately come from reinsurers." Report of Joint Economic Committee,
Economic Perspectives on Terrorism Insurance, May 2, 2002, at 2, 4, at
http://www.house.gov/jec/terrorism/insur.pdf, (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) [hereinafter JEC
REPORT]. To put the total insured loss figure in perspective, prior to 9/11 the largest single-
day loss was Hurricane Andrew, which struck southern Florida in August 1992 and caused
approximately $16 billion in losses. The 9/11 total loss figure may prove to more than the
total insured loss in the five most recent catastrophic losses for the insurance industry prior
to 9/1 I-Hurricanes Andrew and Hugo; the Northridge, California and Kobe, Japan
earthquakes and the Lothar and Martin windstorm in Europe-which totaled $53 billion in
losses. See ROBERT H. JERRY, II UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1065. n.1 (Matthew
Bender & Co., Inc., 3d ed. 2002). See also Robert P. Hartwig, The Long Shadow of
September 11: Terrorism and Its Impacts on Insurance and Reinsurance Markets, July 25,
2002, PowerPoint presentation available at
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/septl l (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) [hereinafter
Hartwig]. The presentation uses data supplied by Insurance Information Institute and Swiss
Re. Id. The figure may also be more than the total insured loss in the ten next most costly
catastrophes in the United States, which include seven hurricanes, the Northridge
earthquake, the 1993 multi-state winter storm, and the 1991 fire in Oakland, California. In
inflation adjusted dollars (as of 1999), these ten events totaled $53.1 billion. INSURANCE
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, FACT BOOK 2001 93 (2001) [hereinafter Insurance Information
Institute].
2. Portions of the following discussion are based upon JERRY, supra note 1, at 1065-
[Vol. 9:1
INSURANCE, TERRORISM, AND 9/11
9/11 "insurance world" different from the pre-9/11 "insurance world?" (3)
If government is to have a role in facilitating terrorism coverage, what
should it be? The discussion begins by looking at two opposing, yet
simultaneously correct, answers to the first question.
I. IS THE POST-9/11 WORLD DIFFERENT FROM THE PRE-9/11 WORLD?
One answer is, "of course it is, and it is silly to suggest otherwise."
This answer makes so much sense that it is difficult to imagine another
answer even being possible. Before 9/11, we had no idea something like
this could happen; now we know it can. That the World Trade Center
towers could vanish-let alone disappear in this manner-was
unfathomable. The structural engineer for the World Trade Center has
stated that engineering analysis at the time the towers were built
contemplated the impact of one of them being hit by a Boeing 707, 3 the
largest civil aircraft of that era, presumably flying at low speed lost in a fog
at the end of a journey. Even if that statement is correct,4 the engineers did
not contemplate a tower being struck by a Boeing 767, a much larger and
heavier aircraft, flying at very high speed (which greatly increases the
forces) loaded with aviation fuel at the beginning of a journey.5 Before
9/11, we understood that America's enemies abroad would continue their
3. See Andrea Oppenheimer Dean, Panelists: Despite Terrorist Attack the Skyscraper
Is Here to Stay, 189 ARCHITECTURAL RECORD 21 (2001) (quoting Leslie Robertson, the
structural engineer for the World Trade Center, "We designed the towers [to withstand the
impact of] a Boeing 707 flying slowly," and not a much larger Boeing 767 flying at top
speed and full of fuel).
4. There is disagreement as to whether the Towers were designed with this scenario in
mind (as opposed to the designers realizing or calculating, after the design was prepared,
that the Towers could withstand this impact). Theo Stein, Professor: Build New, Taller
WTC, DENVER POST, Sept. 20, 2001, at A19 (citing Hyman Brown, professor of civil
engineering, that "[rieports that the building was designed to withstand a crash of a Boeing
707... are false... [t]he calculations suggesting the skyscrapers could survive a plane crash
weren't performed until after the design phase"); Gregory Richards, U Pennsylvania: In
Eyes of Experts, No Way to Anticipate Collapse of Towers, U-WIRE, Sept. 17, 2001 (quoting
Ronald Klemencic, president of engineering firm that designed the Towers' skeleton, as
stating that reports that the Towers were designed to withstand the force of the Boeing 707
are "folklore") (on file with the author).
5. Even if such a scenario had been contemplated, the consensus of experts is that no
engineering design presently exists that would enable a building of this size (or, for that
matter, of any size) to withstand such an impact under similar conditions. Deborah
Snoonian & John E. Czarnecki, World Trade Center's Robust Towers Succumb to
Terrorism, 189 ARCHITECTURAL RECORD 22, 26 (2001) (stating that, "Designers agree that
few structures, no matter what their height, can endure such aggressive attacks.").
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efforts to damage United States interests in other nations, but we apparently
did not understand that those enemies would seek to cause massive civilian
casualties on United States soil. Now that America has experienced
massive devastation at a civilian site on the mainland, we know that such
an event could happen again and we will take much more aggressive steps
to prevent it. We must also prepare ourselves emotionally and
economically for the next attack because we know that our prevention
efforts, no matter how stringent, cannot be one hundred percent effective.
This means that another domestic terrorist attack with civilian casualties
will occur at some time in the future, although whether this will happen
next week, next month, next year, or within the next fifty years cannot be
known. This is the new reality, and it is a massive change from the world
as we knew it on September 10th.
There is, however, another perspective. This alternative view
concedes, as it must, that we did not foresee the destruction of the World
Trade Center. But this view points out that before 9/11 we did understand
that something of this nature and on this scale could happen-even if we
tried to put (and some would say succeeded too easily in putting) these
probabilities outside our consciousness. Several years earlier, many
Americans had read a Tom Clancy novel that bore an eerie similarity to the
events of 9/11.6 Beyond the realm of fiction, the potential for a massive
domestic terrorism incident was demonstrated by the Sarin nerve gas attack
in the Tokyo subway in March 1995, where twelve died and more than
5500 suffered injuries. 7 Had the attack been carried out more skillfully,
5500 or more easily could have perished.8 The potential for domestic
terrorism was demonstrated by Timothy McVeigh's assault on the Murrah
Office Building in Oklahoma City in April 1995. 9 McVeigh was an
amateur using a crude device; as horrific as the Oklahoma City bombing
was, it could have been much worse.' ° The benefits of hindsight always
6. TOM CLANCY, DEnT OF HONOR (1994) (fictional account of terrorists hijacking a
jetliner and crashing it into the U.S. Capitol with devastating consequences).
7. See Tokyo Police say Injured Includes Possible Suspect, BALT. SUN, Mar. 21, 1995,
at A4.
8. See Robert S. Greenberger & Jerry E. Bishop, Suspected Toxic Agent in Attack is
Made of Chemicals Easily Available in US., WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 1995, at A12 (citing
retired member of U.S. Army chemical corps, who explains that the terrorists may have
diluted the chemical's mix for their own safety, which greatly reduced the loss of life).
9. See Laura E. Keeton, Mark Pawlosky & Robert Tomsho, In Broad Daylight-
Terrorism Hits Home: US. Building Bombed, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1995, at Al.
10. See Elizabeth Gleick, This Guy is a National Tragedy, TIME, May 15, 1995, at 43
("Some bomb experts have concluded that McVeigh and his associates were eager amateurs.
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sharpen one's vision, but other events provided good reason for imagining
the potential for terrorism aimed at civilian targets. 1 These include the
Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta during the 1996 Olympic Games,12 the
February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center,13 the August 1998
bombings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 14 and the
IRA bombings in London and other locations dating back to the 1970s.'
5
Ironically, one motive for future attacks results directly from
America's overwhelming military might. Underscored by the rather
limited projection of United States military force in Kosovo and more
recently in Afghanistan, America's foreign enemies undoubtedly learned
one important lesson from the 1991 Gulf War: the overwhelming
technological superiority of United States military forces means that any
According to one investigator, 'If they were truly mad bombers, they could have brought the
building down, and they didn't do it."').
11. Terrorist attacks on military targets arguably belong to a different genre, but the
methods of such attacks are extremely important for understanding potential attacks on
domestic civilian targets. The most notorious examples of terrorism directed at U.S.
military targets include the October 1983 bombing of the Beirut, Lebanon barracks occupied
by U.S. Marines participating in the Mideast peacekeeping mission, which resulted in 242
deaths, William E. Smith, Carnage in Lebanon; Twin Terrorist Bombings Decimate the US.
and French Peacekeeping Forces, TIME, Oct. 31, 1983, at 14; the attempted bombing of
approximately one-hundred U.S. Marines staying at hotels in Yemen in December 1992,
Bombs Explode Near Marines; One Person Killed, AssocLATED PRESS, Dec. 29, 1992; the
June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers, the Saudi Arabia housing facility used by U.S.
Air Force personnel involved the overflight operation in Iraq, which killed nineteen
Americans, Robert S. Greenberger, Saudi Bomb at US. Base Leaves 19 Dead, WALL ST. J.,
June 26, 1996, at A3; and the October 2000 suicide boat attack on the destroyer U.S.S. Cole
in Aden, Yemen, which killed seventeen members of the U.S. Navy, Greg Jaffe, Gunships
Hover Over a Deeper Mideast Morass-US. Investigates Blast That Struck its Ship;
Terrorism Suspected, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2000, at AIS. For a chronology of terrorist
activity since 1992 that includes casualty totals, see Amanda Bower, Terrorist Hits and
Misses; A Chronology of Mayhem, TIME, Nov. 12, 2001, at 68.
12. See Douglas Blackmon, Nikhil Deogun & Robert Frank, FBI is Investigating
'Significant Leads' in its Probe of Bombing at Olympic Site, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at
A3.
13. See William M. Carley, Explosive Theory: Bombing in New York Bears Some
Hallmarks of Mideast Terrorists, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1993, at AI. This attack killed six
and injured more than 1,000 people.
14. See Carla Anne Robbins & Hugh Pope, Bombings Put Focus on Saudi Patron of
Terror-Egyptian Islamic Militants Draw Initial Suspicion in African Explosions, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 10, 1998, at AI0. In this attack, 224 were killed and over 5,000 were injured. Id.
15. See The IRA & Sinn Fein: Chronology, at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/etc/cron.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)
(providing, inter alia, a list of IRA bombings and other attacks through 1999).
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foreign nation, military force, or organization wishing to inflict injury on
America can hope only for extremely limited success if it attempts to
confront the United States military on the traditional battlefield in
conventional terms. Thus, for the foreseeable future, anyone wishing to
inflict harm on the United States-indeed, anyone wishing to "wage war"
against America-will do so surreptitiously, covertly, and
unconventionally, through use of the techniques of the terrorist. 16 That this
was not well understood before 9/11 now appears, with the benefit of
hindsight, to have been naive.
Appreciation of the potentially massive destruction that terrorists could
cause also appears in insurance trade literature before 9/11. In January
1999, Gene Rappe, an underwriter with St. Paul Fire and Marine, published
an essay in which he expressed concern for the "one catastrophe loom[ing]
over the horizon that most insurers don't expect: Terrorism."' 17 Rappe
compared terrorism to catastrophes like "[e]arthquakes, tornadoes, floods,
hail and hurricanes" which "[i]nsurers dread, but expect ... ."8 After
referring to the 1993 World Trade Center and 1995 Oklahoma City
bombings, he observed that
[o]ne bomb planted in a key spot creates an instant
catastrophe resembling a war zone .... When one reflects
upon the fact that one bomb caused each event, the
possibility that terrorists could inflict damages of a war-like
nature, using more lethal bombs or weapons of mass
destruction, is not far fetched.' 9
Like almost everyone else, Rappe did not anticipate the manner of the loss
on 9/11,20 but he, like many others who no doubt had reached the same
16. This observation is, in a sense, unremarkable, because history is replete with
examples of combatants faced with long odds or an overwhelming opposition finding
success in the use of new techniques previously beyond the imagination of the opponents.
17. Gene Rappe, Should Insurers Cover Terrorism?, NAT'L UNDERWRITER (PROP.&
CAS./RISK & BEN. MGMT. ED.), Jan. 11, 1999, at 7. Rappe also published before 9/11 a law
review article on terrorism. Gene Rappe, The Role of Insurance in the Battle Against
Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL Bus. L. J. 351 (1999/2000).
18. Rappe, NAT'L UNDERWRITER, supra note 17, at 7.
19. Id.
20. A notable exception to the foregoing is Rex Hudson, a Library of Congress analyst,
who prepared a report in 1999 on behalf of the Library of Congress' Federal Research
Division in which he predicted "suicide bomber(s) belonging to Al Qaeda's Martyrdom
Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and Semtex) into
the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White
[Vol. 9:1
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conclusion independently but had not published their thoughts in a national
trade journal, understood the risks before 9/11. On September 10th, the
possibility that terrorism could wreak extraordinary damage in an urban
center was not beyond our imagination.2' On September 12th, the main
difference was that what we had earlier known could happen, had in fact
occurred.
Thus, it is correct to say that the world changed on 9/11. An event that
was previously unthinkable occurred, with consequences so vast that it is
inconceivable that we will ever return to the state of things that existed
before. It is, however, also correct to say that this type and size of loss,
while unexpected as a discrete event, was anticipated and imagined before
it occurred. Any time losses happen in any context, things are changed;
one need only talk to those victimized by a loss to grasp this simple point.
But when anticipated losses become real losses, the fundamental order of
relationships in the world is not necessarily altered. Thus, from this
perspective, the world on September 12th was not much different than the
world on September 10th, except with the important qualification that a
major loss with wrenching consequences had occurred in the meantime.
II. IS THE POST-9/1 1 "INSURANCE WORLD" DIFFERENT FROM THE PRE-
9/11 "INSURANCE WORLD?"
Embedded in the general question of whether the world changed on
9/11 is the more specific question of whether the insurance world changed
on that day. Because the magnitude of the loss that occurred on 9/11 was
unprecedented, it was tempting to describe the scale of the event as "off the
charts" and to suggest that the losses suffered exceeded that which the
insurance industry could have ever reasonably expected it would be asked
to absorb.22 By this assessment, 9/1 I's redefinition of the upper boundary
House." Frank James, Report Cited Potential for Suicide Jets; Senior Officials Likely
Didn't See It, Cm. TRm., May 18, 2002, at 1.
21. If one parses Rappe's essay, it is clear that one of his points was that the insurance
industry did not expect a major terrorism event and that this was a major oversight. Thus,
on the one hand, Rappe supports the perspective that the world changed on 9/11 when the
insurance industry was stunned by the event that it did not expect. On the other hand,
Rappe, a member of the industry himself, is representative of some within the industry who
before 9/11 understood that such an event was "not far-fetched," suggesting that we should
not have been surprised when the major attack fimally occurred. Rappe, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, supra note 17, at 7.
22. For discussion of what kinds of insurance are potentially applicable to the events of
9/11 and the most common coverage questions presented under these policies, see Jeffrey
2002]
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of possible loss amounted to an unalterable, permanent change in the
insurance world.23 Moreover, concern has been widespread that terrorists
might have the capability to carry out an attack that would produce
devastation on a scale so massive as to be uninsurable.24 Although such
destruction has rarely been witnessed, many cities in Japan, Germany, and
England suffered these kinds of losses in World War II. The infliction of
similar degrees of destruction would be difficult for a terrorist organization
to accomplish, but 9/11 requires that this possibility be recalculated. The
detonation of a portable nuclear device, a well-placed conventional weapon
laced with radioactive material, or a chemical or biological weapon in an
urban metropolis could cause massive economic loss and many deaths and
personal injuries.25
W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple Lines,
Arguments Over Occurrence Counting, War Risk Exclusions, The Future of Terrorism
Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L. J. 817, 821-32 (2002).
23. Insurance industry representatives routinely expressed this view in their first
reactions to the events of 9/11. See, e.g., Trade Center Disaster Expected to Mark an
Insurance Turning Point, at
http://www3.ambest.com/frames/FrameServer.asp?Site=news&Tab=1 &RefNum=44436&A
ltSrc=13 (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (quoting Bernie Heinze, executive director of the
American Association of Managing General Agents: "It [9/11] will forever change the way
underwriters approach their business" and quoting Joe Annotti, spokesperson for the
National Association of Independent Insurers: "Someone commented, as they watched the
towers collapse and dust cloud billowing out from it, that that is what is going to happen to
the insurance industry.").
24. The possibility of losses on this scale is what gives rise to the "war risk exclusion,"
which puts the consequences of war outside the coverage of property and many other kinds
of policies.
25. It seems obvious that the detonation of a nuclear bomb in an urban center would
dwarf what happened on 9/11. Depending on the location, hundreds of thousands could die
and the destruction of property would be unprecedented. Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes:
The Terrorist Nuclear Threats: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th
Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002) (statement of Dr. Harry C. Vantine, Division Leader,
Counterterrorism and Incident Response) (noting that terrorist's detonation of an improvised
nuclear device would have "catastrophic effects" and "could dwarf the devastation of the
September 11 attack"). A so-called "dirty bomb"-a conventional bomb laced with
radioactive material-would cause much less destruction and loss of life, but the clean-up
costs and economic loss could be enormous. Dirty Bombs and Basement Nukes: The
Terrorist Nuclear Threats: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong.,
2nd Sess. (2002) (statement of Dr. Donald D. Cobb, Associate Laboratory Director for
Threat Reduction) (discussing effect of radiological dispersal devices, or so-called "dirty
bombs"). Huge Financial Fallout from Dirty Bomb (Reuters), available at
http://www.news24.com/News24/USAttack/O,l 113,2-1195_1 197646,00.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002) (explaining that while loss of life would not be in the hundreds of thousands
[Vol. 9:1
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There is, however, another perspective. Catastrophic loss is not new to
the insurance industry, and terrorism arguably stands as simply another
kind of catastrophe, a peril neither quantitatively nor qualitatively different
from the various kinds of natural disasters. If acts of terrorism are uniquely
different, one might have expected insurance markets to seriously flounder
in the face of 9/11, but this did not occur. The markets coped remarkably
well, demonstrating the insurance industry's preparation and ability to
handle such an event. Under this alternative view, the insurance world's
order did not change on 9/11, even as the industry confronted an event
unprecedented in magnitude. Just as the general question discussed
above-whether the world changed on 9/11-has two opposing but
plausible answers, both perspectives on what 9/11 means to the insurance
world have some merit. Although it is fair to claim that the upper boundary
of possible lossfrom terrorism changed on 9/11,26 it is also correct to assert
that before 9/11 insurers contemplated and anticipated single-day or single-
event losses on the scale of those suffered on 9/11. Hurricanes,
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and other natural events27 all carry with
as is likely with a crude nuclear device, the financial cost of cleanup would be in the
billions, with it possible that affected land would have to be abandoned). Chemical and
biological weapons would not destroy property, but decontamination costs of uncertain-
perhaps massive-size would result. Depending on the circumstances, loss of life could be
enormous. See Office of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Aug. 1993), at 52-59.
26. As discussed above, the projections that might have been made pre-9/11 based on
past terrorism events makes even this proposition debatable. But the data comparing the
insured loss on 9/11 to the next nine largest terrorism events in the world, even when all
losses are adjusted to 2001 dollars, show that the losses in New York City dwarf all of the
other events. The second largest event, after 9/11, is the 1993 IRA bombing in London,
where losses were $907 million. Five of the nine terrorist incidents involve insured losses
less than $400 million. In inflation-adjusted dollars, the insured loss on 9/11 will be in the
vicinity of ten times (or more) that of the combined losses in the nine largest previous
terrorist events. See JEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-4 (citing data from Swiss Re).
27. Windstorms (including tornados or straight-line winds) can produce catastrophic
losses. A tsunami (a large wave caused by an earthquake on the ocean floor or an asteroid
impact in the ocean) could cause devastating coastal losses. A meteorite or asteroid striking
Earth is, unfortunately, not science-fiction fantasy. In 1908, a "near earth object" (NEO)
exploded over Tunguska, Siberia with the explosive force of more than fifteen megatons of
TNT. This was a relatively small event, given the size of other NEOs that could strike our
planet. Incredibly, although the risk is slight, the risk of perishing in a catastrophic NEO
impact is, by one scientist's calculation, about the same as perishing in an airliner crash and
is greater than the risk of dying in a flood or tornado. Dr. Clark R. Chapman, Statement on
The Threat of Impact by Near-Earth Asteroids, Southwest Research Institute, May 21, 1998,
2002]
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them the possibility of financial losses in the tens-and even hundreds--of
billions of dollars. During the last twenty years, the extremely rapid pace
of coastal development has greatly increased the loss exposure in prime
hurricane territory,28 and similar magnitudes of exposure exist in areas of
available at http://impact.arc.nasa.gov/congress/1998-may/hapman.html (last visited Nov.
9, 2002).
Based on estimates of the number of objects out there, astronomers expect
an asteroid 1 kilometer (1,100 yards) in diameter to collide with the Earth
about once every 100,000 years, on average. Such an impact is thought to
be at the threshold of global catastrophe[-] 100 million people could die,
mainly from starvation due to global crop failures . . .An asteroid 50
yards in diameter could easily devastate a city.
Michael Paine, Chicken Little Was Right: The Sky is Falling, at
http://www.explorezone.com/columns/space/1999/ulyneo overview.htm (last visited Nov.
9, 2002). According to "the astronomers who operate the Near Earth Asteroid Tracking
(NEAT) project" the number of one-kilometer asteroids is about 700-down from the
previous estimate of 2,000. Michael Paine, Asteroid Hunters Downgrade Overall Threat to
Earth, at http://www.explorezone.com/archives/00_01/12_asteroidodds.htm (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002). Contra Antonio Regalado, Beware of Falling Rocks: Scientists Lay Plans to
Keep NEOs (Near-Earth Objects) from Smashing the Planet, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2002, at
B 1 (putting the number of one-kilometer-wide NEOs at 1,200). "If [the estimate of 700 is]
accurate, the new number would reduce the odds of a civilization-destroying impact in any
one year from about 1 in 100,000 to about 1 in 300,000, something still more likely than
being dealt a royal flush in five-card poker." Michael Paine, Asteroid Hunters Downgrade
Overall Threat to Earth, at http://explorezone.com/archives/00_0 1/12_asteroid odds.htm
(last visited Nov. 9, 2002). Cf Asteroidscience, at
http://www.explorezone.com/space/asteroids.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2002) (noting that
asteroids large enough to create a "'nuclear winter' . . . strike Earth only once every 1,000
centuries on average, NASA officials say," whereas "[s]maller asteroids that are believed to
strike Earth every 1,000 to 10,000 years could destroy a city or cause devastating
tsunamis."). For additional information on NEOs, see NeoDys Risk Page, at
http://newton.dm.unipi.itlcgi-bin/neodys/neoibo?riskpage:0;main (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
28. Prediction: Coastal Development Will Lead to Hurricane Disaster, DAYTONA
BEACH NEWS, June 14, 2002, available at http://www.news-
journalonline.com/2002/JunI14/CANE2.htm (visited Nov. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Prediction]
(citing Max Mayfield, director of the National Hurricane Center, who observes that the
United States could be hit with a hurricane disaster causing more than $80 billion in damage
because of increased coastal development). "In 1960, an average of 187 people were living
on each square mile of U.S. coast, excluding Alaska. That population density increased to
273 per square mile by 1994 and is expected to reach 327 by 2015." John McQuaid & Mark
Schleifstein, Developing Disasters, Huge Bills Will Surely Come Due for Population
Growth in High-Risk Areas, SEATrLE TIMEs, July 8, 2002 at A3. "If a Category 5 hurricane
with winds of 155 mph (258 km/h) hit the U.S. coast, the damage could be enormous as the
value of U.S. coastal property in the hurricane belt is at least $6.4 trillion." CNN, Warmer
Ocean Equals More Hurricanes, available at http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents
(last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
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the United States vulnerable to earthquake or volcanic eruption.29 In some
respects, we have been fortunate that severe natural disasters have avoided
dense population centers. For example, until 9/11, the largest disaster was
Hurricane Andrew, which caused approximately $16 billion in losses 3 -a
number that would have increased three to four times if the hurricane had
made a direct hit on the Miami metropolitan area.3' Where hurricanes
make landfall is completely random; it seems obvious enough that
eventually a large hurricane will strike Miami, New Orleans, or another
large city and cause property damage greatly exceeding that which
occurred in New York City on 9/11 32
Catastrophic earthquakes constitute a risk that many are surprised to
learn is not confined to the west coast of the United States. Memphis,
Tennessee is near the New Madrid fault, which is the source of earthquakes
that struck the Midsouth in 1811-1812 and are thought by some scientists
to be the largest earthquakes ever to strike North America (at least in
recorded history).33 A similar earthquake today could devastate Memphis
and cities as far north as St. Louis, 34 perhaps causing damages as high as
$115 billion.3" According to the U.S. Geological Survey, the San Francisco
Bay area has a seventy-percent chance of a 6.7 earthquake before 2030.36
29. See infra notes 37 and 43 and accompanying text.
30. INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 93.
31. See Steve Tuckey, Analysis Takes Stock of Alternative Risk, 12 INS. ACCT (Apr. 2,
2001). According to the director of the National Hurricane Center, if a hurricane like the
one that struck Miami in 1926, which killed 243 people and caused $112 million in
damages, were to strike Miami today, the storm would cause about $87 billion in damage.
Prediction, supra note 28.
32. For example, "there's roughly a one in six chance that a killer hurricane will strike
New Orleans over the next 50 years." American Radio Works, Hurricane Risk for New
Orleans, available at http://americanradioworks.org/features/wetlands/hurricanel.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002). In addition to massive property destruction, somewhere between
20,000 and 100,000 fatalities would result. See American Radio Works, Hurricane Risk for
New Orleans: Terrible Devastation, available at
http://www.americanradioworks.org/features/wetlands/hurricane5.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2002).
33. Center for Earthquake Research and Information, The University of Memphis, The
New Madrid Fault System, at http://www.ceri.Memphis.edu/public/facts-long.shtml (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
34. McQuaid & Schleifstein, supra note 28.
35. See Tuckey, supra note 31.
36. WORKING GROUP ON CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE PROBABILITIES, EARTHQUAKE
PROBABILITIES IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION: 2000 TO 2030--A SUMMARY OF
FINDINGS (1999); Major Quake Likely to Strike Between 2000 and 2030, available at
http://geopubs.wr.usgs.gov/factsheet/fs152-99/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
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A 1995 study estimated that if an earthquake similar to the 1906 San
Francisco quake struck the same area today, fatalities could reach 8000 and
total damages could reach $225 billion,37 a sum nearly three times all
economic loss suffered in New York City on 9/11.
The risk of volcanic eruption did not worry us during most of the
twentieth century, but we should probably have paid more attention to this
risk. After all, the destruction of Pompeii and Herculaneum in the
unexpected eruption of Mt. Vesuvius in August A.D. 79 is a well-known
example of the complete destruction of cities by natural disaster, and there
are others.38 Probably the reason Americans were so casual about this risk
before the eruption of Mt. St. Helens in 1980 was that the last prior
volcanic activity in the United States had been a series of small eruptions at
Mt. Lassen in California, from 1914 to 1917. 39 The case law even tells of
one insurer revising its easy-read homeowners policy to delete any mention
of volcanoes in the list of exclusions shortly before the eruption of Mt. St.
Helens.4° When Mt. St. Helens lost approximately 1100 feet of its height
and destroyed a few hundred homes in a rather remote area of Oregon in
the process, we began to pay more attention to the active volcanic range
that runs along most of the west coast of the United States. Scientists now
know that past eruptions in the Cascade range were far more violent than
the Mt. St. Helens eruption. For example, the eruption (and destruction) of
Mt. Mazama about 7700 years ago was fifty times more powerful than Mt.
St. Helens; what is left of this mountain is now the world's seventh deepest
lake, Crater Lake in Oregon, located in a crater six miles across. 4' There
37. Haresh C. Shah, Earthquake Risk Management: A Crucial Ingredient in Reducing
Death, Injury, and Economic Disruption, at
http://www.anglia.ac.uk/geography/radix/gujarat2.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
38. The sudden eruption of Mt. Vesuvius on August 24, A.D. 79 buried these two cities
so thoroughly in only a few hours that their ruins were not uncovered for nearly 1,700 years.
See Italy Volcanoes and Volcanics, at
http://vulcan.wr.usgs.govNolcanoes/Italy/description-italyvolcanics.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002). See also The Eruption of A.D. 79, at
http://www.geo.mtu.edu/-boris/VESUVIO_79.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). In 1902, on
the Caribbean island of Martinique, Mt. Pelee erupted and sent a pyroclastic flow into the
town of St. Pierre, killing 29,000 people. The 1991 eruption of Mt. Pinatubo in the
Philippines released enough volcanic material to bury a space the size of Manhattan 1,000
feet deep. Jack McClintock, Under the Volcano, DISCOVER, Nov. 1999, at 82, 85.
39. U.S. Geological Survey, Fact Sheet 173-98, Eruptions of Lassen Peak, California,
1914 to 1917, at http://geopubs.wr.usgs.gov/fact-sheet/fs 173-98 (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
40. Graham v. Pub. Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077, 1079 (Wash. 1983).
41. The former Mt. Mazama was one of the larger mountains in the Cascade range,
between 10,800 and 12,000 feet in height. The eruption was witnessed by native American
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are sixty-five active volcanoes in the United States-more than any other
country except Japan and Indonesia-and many of these mountains are
overdue for an eruption.42 Washington's Mt. Rainier, the tallest mountain
in the Cascade range, is a particularly dangerous peak. According to
scientists with the U.S. Geologic Survey, "[d]uring the past 10,000 years,
about 60 giant debris flows from Mount Rainier have filled river valleys to
a depth of hundreds of feet near the volcano, and have buried the land
surface under many feet of mud and rock sixty miles downstream. Seven
debris flows large enough to reach Puget Sound have occurred in the past
6,000 years." 43 Some entire communities are built on the remains of the
mudflows of past eruptions. 44 Scientists calculate that "residents of the
[Puget Sound L]owlands have a one in seven chance of being affected by
massive mudlows from Rainier within their lifetimes." 45  Should Mt.
Rainier awaken from its long slumber, the consequences to the
northwestern United States will be extraordinarily devastating.46
peoples who passed to later generations stories about the event. The force of the eruption
was about fifty times that of Mt. St. Helens; the amount of ash and ejected material from Mt.
Mazama could have evenly covered the entire state of Oregon nine inches deep. The crater
where Mt. Mazama once stood averages more than five miles in diameter, and is 1,958 feet
deep. United States Geographic Service, Description: Mount Mazama Volcano and Crater
Lake Caldera, Oregon, available at
http:/Nulcan.wr.usgs.gov/Volcanoes/CraterLake?description-crater-lake.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002).
42. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, US. Geological Survey, US. Has 65 Active Volcanoes..
Reducing the Risk from Active Volcanoes, Aug. 27, 1997, available at
http://www.usgs.gov/public/press/publicaffairs/press releases/pr315m.htmil (last visited
Nov. 9, 2002). See also McClintock, supra note 38, at 85.
43. Discovery Channel/TLC, Mount Rainier: Preparing for the Worst, 2000, at
http://tlc.discovery.com/tlcpages/volcano/americal.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter Discovery Channel].
44. "About 100,000 people now live in areas that have been buried by debris flows
during the past few thousand years." McClintock, supra note 38, at 89.
45. Discovery Channel, supra note 43.
46. Geologists estimate that a lahar [a volcanic mudflow, originating from
Mount Rainier] could slip down the mountain and arrive at the town of
Orting in less than an hour....
A large lahar, traveling at 30 miles an hour, would quickly sweep
over Orting and continue down the Puyallup Valley towards more densely
populated areas [including] [tihe towns of Sumner, Ashford, Elbe,
Packwood, Randle, Greenwater, [as well as] [p]arts of Tacoma, Buckley,
Enumclaw, South Prairie, Carbonado, and Wilkeson.
Micah Fink, Savage Planet: Volcanic Killers: America's Most Dangerous Volcano,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/savageplanet/Olvolcano/03/indexmid.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2002). The lahar would then "continue onwards toward the lowlands of Puget Sound. In
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Thus, one cannot claim that the terrorism risk merits special treatment
under the logic that terrorism losses are large and uninsurable in contrast to
the kinds of losses caused by natural disasters.47 Some terrorism events are
accompanied by losses well within the capacity of the insurance industry
(consider, for example, the small bomb that damages a business), 48 and the
same is true with respect to natural disasters. By the same token, one can
imagine terrorist acts or natural disasters that would easily outstrip the
industry's capacity. These events might usefully be labeled as "mega-
catastrophes" or "cataclysms" 49 to distinguish them from the "smaller
catastrophes" that the industry can manage. Private risk-spreading
mechanisms are irrelevant to losses in the mega-catastrophic category;
when losses of this magnitude occur, government institutions must become
the means of repairing loss and spreading the risk of future similar losses.
all, 30,000 Puyallup River Valley residents could be in direct danger, along with 100,000
people living in the mountain's six other valleys." Id. A similar event occurred less than
two decades ago in Columbia. In 1985, a small eruption of snowcapped Nevado del Ruiz
created a volcanic mudflow one-fifth the size of the Amazon, which buried 23,000 people in
the town of Amero. This town had been built on a solidified mudflow from a previous
eruption, much like a number of the towns near Mt. Rainier. McClintock, supra note 38, at
86.
47. Indeed, in one respect it may be easier to insure terrorism than the risk of natural
disaster. Conceptually, terrorism attacks the symbols of America, which is tantamount to an
attack on all of America. Thus, it is both logical and politically palatable to spread the risk
across the entire nation. Natural disasters are different, as becomes evident when one asks a
worker in a Wisconsin cheese factory to subsidize insurance on a Florida beachfront home,
a California condominium perched on a known fault line, a farm in the Missouri River flood
plain, or a mountain resort at the foot of an active volcano. This phenomenon, however,
may only work ex poste and not ex ante. By way of illustration, consider the answer we
should expect to receive from an Indiana farmer who is asked to help fund a terrorism
insurance backstop that would facilitate the future establishment of a business in the shadow
of the Sears Tower or the future construction of a 100-story skyscraper.
48. Sometimes the boundary between terrorism and vandalism is hazy, particularly
when the magnitude of the incident is small. For example, in May, 2002, a series of pipe
bombs accompanied by anti-government letters were placed in rural mailboxes in Nebraska,
Iowa, and Illinois, injuring six people. Clemente Lisi, Pipe-Bomb Peril Spreads: Post
Office Warns of More Mayhem, N.Y. POST, May 5, 2002, at 7. These acts fit most
definitions of terrorism. In the absence of personal injury, however, it may be more
appropriate to view such incidents as vandalism.
49. The term "cataclysm" was used by Cutler and Zeckhauser to make a distinction
between insurable and uninsurable catastrophes. See David M. Cutler & Richard J.
Zeckhauser, Reinsurance for Catastrophes and Cataclysms, in THE FINANCING OF
CATASTROpImC RISK (1999), at 239 ("We term events that would exhaust the reserves of
worldwide insurers in a particular risk market cataclysms.").
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Although the 9/11 losses constitute the largest single-event loss in history,
they do not reach that level.
That terrorism does not present a unique challenge to the insurance
industry is, it might be argued, demonstrated by the success with which the
industry absorbed the effects of 9/11. Although the final accounting is not
complete and will not be so for some time, the 9/11 losses were within the
industry's capacity; the industry continues to demonstrate that it was well
prepared before 9/11 to digest an event of this size without default or
insolvency. In the wake of the disaster, much of the expended capital was
replenished, and new capacity continues to flow into the industry in 2002.0
Terrorism coverage, although more expensive, has generally been available
since 9/11; businesses were not always pleased with its price, but these
increases were for many fums no greater than what had occurred in other
insurance cycles. Although coverage disappeared for some businesses (this
is similar to what happened during the pollution coverage "crisis" in the
1980s; in that situation, coverage was eventually found in appropriate
amounts for most businesses that needed it), the market did not collapse. 5
In this respect, the markets' response to 9/11 is similar to what happened
after what was previously the largest catastrophe in history. After
Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida in 1992, commercial reinsurers
restricted coverage and raised prices. In turn, primary insurers, desiring to
pass along the reinsurance premium increases and not wanting exposure on
risks where reinsurance was lacking, raised prices, canceled some policies
50. According to data supplied by Morgan Stanley, total capital flowing into the
property-casualty industry since 9/11 is approximately $44.5 billion. Hartwig, supra note 1.
See also Barbara Bowers, Reinsurance Rebound, BEST'S REV., Aug. 1, 2002, at 26 (stating
that "[s]ince Sept. 11, fresh capital has been flowing into the insurance industry in response
to tight capacity and rising premiums"); Martin J. Nilsen, Perspective: Market Gets Capital
Infusion: Hardening Market, Sept. 11 Spur Growth, Bus. INs., July 15, 2002, at 12H (noting
that "unprecedented losses arising from Sept. 11, coming on the heels of a resurgent hard
market that was gaining momentum in the months before the terrorist attacks, have acted as
a catalyst for an infusion of new capital."). Not surprisingly, the capital situation receives
different interpretations from different constituencies. See Brendan Noonan, Insurers Cast
Wary Eye on Flow of New Capital, BEST'S INS. NEWs, Feb. 22, 2002, at 1 (stating that
"[t]he flow of new capital into the insurance industry after Sept. 11 impressed veteran
observers, but views vary on how necessary or permanent the fresh reservoir of funding
might prove to be.").
51. See, e.g., Bowers, supra note 50, at 27 (quoting Mike Koziol, counsel for the
National Association of Independent Insurers, "[t]he reinsurance marketplace is working-
under some strained conditions-but it is working as a free market" and that "[w]hile many
reinsurers now have excluded [terrorism], others have not and are covering terrorism to a
limited degree based on the nature of the underlying risk.").
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on properties in coastal areas, and increased deductibles for insureds with
significant hurricane exposure. Within a couple of years, the reinsurance
market stabilized, which in turn was followed by a new period of stability
in the primary market. In short, transitory capacity problems in insurance
are not uncommon, and, in the absence of multiple "shocks" in a short
period of time, these problems are generally self-correcting.52
There is, however, an alternative interpretation of conditions in
insurance markets. In May 2002, the Joint Economic Committee
summarized the situation with respect to cost and availability of terrorism
insurance as follows: "[t]errorism insurance policies are available on a
limited basis today. Policies are more available and affordable today than
in the weeks after 9/11. However, terrorism insurance is still very
expensive, terms are restrictive and coverage limits are frequently too low,
when it is available at all."53 To take a few of many possible examples, 54
property insurance for the firm managing an office building one block from
the White House has doubled, rising from $2 million to $4 million,
according to one report.55 Insurers have cut the coverage limits for
property and casualty insurance for George Washington University's
downtown campus in half (from $1 billion to $500 million), have raised the
premium 160 percent, and have advised that renewing terrorism coverage
will be fifteen times more expensive.56 Post 9/11, premiums at "trophy"
properties in central Washington and New York City have increased fifty to
one hundred percent, and in suburban areas premiums have increased about
twenty-five percent; moreover, the coverage for terrorism is now excluded
or greatly reduced in these areas. 57  The Metropolitan Transportation
Authority, which oversees New York City's subway, bus system, railways,
52. See Anne Gron & Alan 0. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the
Government as Insurer?, JOHN M. OLIN, LAW & ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER No. 155 (2d
Series), July 2002, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
53. JEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
54. A compendium of examples of the high cost or lack of availability of terrorism
coverage can be viewed on the Website of the Coalition to Insure Against Terrorism, at
http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/factsexamples.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002). For
another collection of examples, see JEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
55. Spencer S. Hsu, Insurance Rates Rise in D.C., Soar Downtown, WASH. POST, June
13, 2002, at Al.
56. Id.
57. Id. Yet, the District of Columbia Insurance Commissioner was quoted as saying
that "the market is under pressure, but buyers and sellers seem to be bearing the price
increases." Id.
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tunnels, and bridges, saw its terrorism coverage limits shrink from $1.5
billion pre-9/11 to $100 million currently. 58 Professional sports venues and
teams throughout the nation have seen insurance costs rise. For example,
coverage for Milwaukee's Miller Park, the site of baseball's All-Star game
in July 2002, saw its annual insurance premium rise from $225,000 to
$2.25 million.59 Results of a June 2002 survey of its commercial members
by the Mortgage Bankers Association of America found that the lack of
affordable terrorism coverage for commercial properties had stopped $3.7
billion in deals in 2002 and delayed or changed the pricing on another $4.5
billion.6°
What should be made of these different descriptions of 9/11 's impact
on insurance markets? If one agrees that 9/11 defines the upper boundary
of potential terrorism losses in the United States, it might be possible to
embrace with confidence the conclusion that the insurance world did not
change appreciably on 9/11. The problem, however, is that we are not, and
cannot be, certain that the upper boundary has been reached, and we are
uncertain about where the mean now rests in the distribution of terrorism
losses. When risk is measured, one assumes a normal distribution of
expected losses, and one expects both the frequency of losses in discrete
time periods and the severity of losses to regress to the mean. History
teaches, however, that we cannot be certain where the mean is located at
any particular point in time. Also, our uncertainty increases with respect to
risks that produce loss on a less frequent basis, such as, for example,
earthquakes as compared to auto accidents. One of the lessons of 9/11 is
that the mean with respect to terrorism losses is not where we previously
thought it rested.61 Further, because this lesson was taught in such an
unforgettable way, we are not confident about our current understanding of
58. See Russ Banham, Terrorism Insurance: Pray as You Go, CFO MAGAZINE, Feb.
2002, at 27.
59. Darren Rovell, Terrorism Insurance Bill Could Aid Sports World, June 18, 2002, at
http://espn.go.com/sportsbusiness/s/2002/0618/1396438.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
60. Mortgage Bankers Association of America, More than $8 Billion in Commercial
Property Deals Killed, Delayed or Changed Due to Terrorism Insurance Issues, July 15,
2002, at http://www.mbaa.org/news/2002/pr0715a.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
61. When our leaders tell us we have a "'new normalcy' in America or when pundits
observe that "things will never be the same again," the same point is being made about an
altered understanding of the location of the mean. See Vice President Cheney Delivers
Remarks to the Republican Governors Association, Oct. 25, 2001, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20011025.html) (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002).
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where the events of 9/11 will fit in the normal distribution of catastrophic
losses.
Whatever is said about the current status of insurance markets, whether
markets need help in the future in dealing with the risk of terrorism
presents a different question. Again, the comparison to natural disasters is
helpful. Based on past experience as reflected in accumulated statistical
information and sophisticated predictive models, scientists can estimate the
frequency of earthquakes and hurricanes. In contrast, terrorism involves
losses produced by humans, the timing and severity of which are not
subject to reliable prediction. In particular, the frequency of terrorism
losses is an extremely difficult variable to measure. Massive terrorism
losses could occur, for example, in close succession temporally; indeed,
many Americans feared precisely this scenario in the immediate aftermath
of 9/11.62 A series of catastrophes, no one of which in isolation outstrips
the insurance industry's capacity, could cumulatively constitute a "mega-
catastrophe." Past experience strongly suggests that this is highly unlikely
to occur with respect to natural disasters, but intuitively such a conclusion
seems less reliable with respect to the peril of terrorism. In addition,
historical data show that hurricanes and earthquakes have random paths,
and one can reliably expect a measurable proportion of hurricanes and
earthquakes to strike relatively unpopulated and less developed areas. In
contrast, terrorists typically select targets in order to maximize the impact
of their efforts, which usually means maximizing loss of life, damage to
property, or both.63 In the case of volcanoes and hurricanes, the science of
seismology and atmospherics makes it possible to warn those who are in
harm's way, which in turn makes it possible to mitigate loss to some extent.
In contrast, terrorist acts usually come with little or no warning, occurring
whenever a human actor is sufficiently motivated to act. In short, natural
62. The nonoccurrence of a second 9/11 -type attack in the months after 9/11 suggests
that orchestrating a large number of 9/11 -type events in close succession is difficult, both in
terms of planning and execution. After one event, heightened awareness leads to preventive
measures that are likely to avert or mitigate future losses. This was most dramatically
illustrated on 9/11 by the manner in which the fourth hijacked airliner was prevented from
reaching its target. This implies that terrorism events may adhere to the same distributional
patterns as natural disasters. The problem, however, is that we do not know this; even if we
did, we may be unable to assimilate or accept it. In other words, we are in a relative sense
more uncertain about the frequency of terrorism losses than we are about the frequency of
natural disasters.
63. This does not dispute that many terrorist attacks cause small losses, such as the car
bomb that damages a business, etc. The point here is that terrorists seek to maximize the
damage (output) from their efforts (input).
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catastrophes do not self-select their targets or self-calibrate their destructive
force.64
Even granting these obvious differences, it might be argued that there
is no obvious reason why pricing models for terrorism coverage cannot be
developed. For example, the FBI keeps statistical records on terrorist
events, both at home and abroad, 65 and this data set might be an appropriate
starting point for the development of a pricing model. Further study of
terrorism losses may reveal that just as there is a "normal distribution" of
loss from natural catastrophes, there is a distribution of terrorism losses
66
with an identifiable mean that can be used to price future coverage.
Indeed, as Professor David Cummins has observed, the industry offers
political risk insurance and insurance for satellite launches, even though the
64. The differences between natural catastrophes and terrorist acts also explain why
terrorism catastrophes have more severe psychological impacts on those victimized. One
psychologist explains it this way:
In contrast to a natural disaster, which is random and unpreventable,
terrorist acts are purposeful and can be directed at everyone, including the
innocent children. In contrast to a natural disaster in which few, if any,
died, the terrorist acts on September 11 may have killed as many as 6,000,
including children and other innocent people. However, one of the most
important differences between a natural disaster and a terrorist act is the
connectedness factor. It can greatly affect the degree to which one feels
traumatized. It can be determined by estimating how much the respondent
identifies with the helpless and victimized. High identity, including those
with relatives and friends who died would be the most difficult to
overcome. Fundamentally, man-made trauma causes more harm than
natural disasters and accidents.
Charles R. Figley, Terrorism and the Nature of Traumatic Events, FAMILY THERAPY
MAGAZINE, Jan./Feb. 2002, available at
http://www.aamfi.org/resources/ProductEvents/magazine_article.htm (last visited Nov. 9,
2002).
65. FBI, Counterterrorism Threat Assessment and Warning Unit, Terrorism in the
United States (1999) available at http://www.fbi.gov/publication/terror/terror99.pdf (last
visited Nov. 9, 2002). According to this report, over "14,000 international terrorist attacks
have taken place worldwide since 1968." Id. at 15. Acts of domestic terrorism have
accounted for the majority of terrorist attacks in the United States over the past twenty
years, and no serious act of international terrorism in the U.S. had occurred before the 1993
bombing of the World Trade Center. Id. at 16.
66. Within a year after 9/11, some risk modelers had developed and were soon to offer
insurers predictive models for terrorism insurance pricing. Erika Morphy, Three Firms
Offer Insurers Models for Terrorism, INS. FINANCE & INVESTMENT, Sept. 15, 2002, at 9. See
also Chad Bray, Terrorism Insurance Hard to Come By For Many Companies, AP
NEWSWIRE, Sept. 27, 2002 (discussing terrorism catastrophe modeling). Whether and to
what extent insurers would accept these models was not yet known in late 2002.
2002]
CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL
data set for pricing these risks would appear to be much smaller than
existing data sets for terrorism.67 But there is another perspective. The
foreseeable losses from these perils are not potentially catastrophic (i.e., a
satellite loss might measure in the millions, but not in the billions), and this
surely makes margins of error in the data set tolerable, which is not the
situation when potential losses are $50 billion, $100 billion, or more. In
addition, even if one concurs that terrorism is not so unusual as to be
uninsurable, pricing models do not now exist that will support a robust
market in terrorism insurance. The future may see the emergence of such
models, but the industry will need time to develop them.
Thus, the question of whether 9/11 has changed the insurance world
cannot be answered simply. In some respects, nothing is different;
terrorism is simply another form of catastrophe with which insurance
markets will deal in the usual ways. But it is difficult to be sanguine about
this assessment. Terrorism, at least intuitively, seems less predictable in
terms of magnitude and frequency of loss, and this raises doubts about the
capacity of the industry with respect to future events. Capacity is a
problem for natural disasters, too, but there is less uncertainty, in a relative
sense, about the normal distribution of catastrophic natural disaster losses.
Until the uncertainty with respect to the terrorism risk abates and markets
stabilize, problems of cost and availability of insurance coverage for
terrorism will persist. This, of course, has been true in other insurance
sectors in the past, and temporary dislocations do not necessarily justify
government intervention. The question, then, is what use, if any, should be
made of government risk spreading mechanisms with respect to terrorism.
67. See Protecting Policyholders from Terrorism: Private Sector Solutions, Hearing
Before the House Subcomm. on Capital Mit., Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enter., 107th Cong.
2 (2001) (statement of J. David Cummins, Harry J. Loman Professor of Ins. and Risk
Mgmt., The Wharton School, Univ. of Penn.), available at
http://fmancialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/102401dc.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2002)
[hereinafter statement of Cummins & Loman]. It may be, however, that satellite insurance
is a poor illustration to support this point. According to one report, the "global satellite
industry faces a worsening insurance crunch" as "$1.5 billion in anticipated new claims...
threaten the availability of future liability coverage." Andy Pasztor, Insurance Issues
Threaten Satellite Industry, WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2002, at B3.
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III. IF GOVERNMENT IS TO HAVE A ROLE IN FACILITATING TERRORISM
COVERAGE, WHAT SHOULD IT BE?
As with the preceding two questions, the question of the appropriate
role of government in facilitating terrorism coverage receives different
answers from different constituencies. Whatever one's perspective, it
cannot be claimed that the tasks of reallocating risk and serving as the
insurer of last resort are foreign to the federal government.68 Where private
insurance markets are inadequate to distribute risk or to provide the
resources necessary to regenerate property that is vital to the well being of
our nation, the vast risk-spreading potential of government has often been
tapped. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, those who questioned
the ability of insurance markets to absorb the losses suggested the need for
some kind of government-funded insurance mechanism to "backstop" the
private sector.69 Supporters of government intervention can cite not only
the federal government's experience as an insurer, but also programs in
other nations where the central government plays a major role in
underwriting terrorism coverage.70 To the surprise of many, the success of
the insurance industry in absorbing the losses that occurred on 9/11 and the
fact that market failures did not occur after 9/11 to the extent many
predicted took much of the steam out of the pro-government backstop
position in late 2001 and early 2002. The House of Representatives passed
a bill in December 2001 that would create a federal backstop for property
and casualty insurance, 7' but similar legislation stalled in the Senate. A
GAO study released in late February 2002 listed many examples of firms
68. See DAVID A. Moss, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS: GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK
MANAGER (2002) (discussing risk management as a public policy of government). See also
JERRY, supra note 1, at 57-60 (overview of various government programs where government
serves as provider of insurance).
69. See, e.g., Lynna Goch, Support Grows For Federal Terrorism Backstop,
BESTWIRE, Nov. 28, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL 24725898.
70. See JEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 17.
71. See Terrorism Insurance Proposals[;] Comparison of Key Features: 6/25/02, at
http://www.insureagainstterrorism.org/pdf/bill.comparison.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2002).
Under H.R. 3210, the federal government would provide coverage for 90% of losses
exceeding $1 billion, subject to a requirement that the industry repay the government over
time. Id. The first $20 billion would be repaid via industry-wide assessments, and aid
exceeding $20 billion would be repaid via policy surcharges. Id. In return, all commercial
insurers must provide terrorism coverage in accordance with to-be-created "consistent state
guidelines." The program would expire on January 1, 2003, but could be authorized for an
additional two years by the Secretary of the Treasury. Id.
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and businesses having trouble getting needed terrorism coverage,72 but the
study disappointed those who were expecting quantification of significant
costs to the economy from insurance unavailability in the aftermath of
9/11. During the spring of 2002, however, Congress continued to hear
stories of economic dislocation caused by the unavailability of reasonably
affordable terrorism coverage.73  A report of the Joint Economic
Committee in May 2002 also sharpened the analysis of the economic
dislocations that would occur if another 9/11 event occurred while
terrorism coverage continues to erode. The report found "a growing
amount of evidence that the difficulty and cost of obtaining terrorism
insurance pose a very real threat to sustained economic growth., 74 In the
face of this analysis, the persistent recession, and the realities of election
year politics, senators found it difficult not to support legislation designed
to make insurance available to businesses and firms needing it. In June
2002, the Senate passed its own version of a government backstop,75 and as
of September 2002, differences in the Senate and House legislation were
scheduled to be resolved in conference committee. Although in early
2002 it seemed unlikely that insurance backstop legislation would pass the
72. Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks Heightens Potential
Economic Vulnerabilities, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations,
of the House Comm. on Fin. Serv., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Richard J. Hillman,
Director, Financial Mkts. and Cmty. Inv.).
73. See JEC REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, 7.
74. Id. at 8. The Report concluded that the lack of insurance is stopping some business
deals, the high cost of insurance when it is available is diverting resources from other more
productive uses, thereby negatively affecting investment and jobs, and low coverage limits
are shifting risk to businesses, which means insurance payments needed to rebuild will not
be available in the event of another attack similar to 9/11. See id. at 8-15.
75. Under Senate Bill 2600, the federal government would provide coverage for
ninety-percent of losses (over a per company retention) exceeding $10 billion and eighty-
percent of losses (over a per company retention) between $1 billion and $10 billion. In
return, all property and casualty policies issued by "participating insurance companies" (as
defined in the bill) must provide terrorism coverage. The per company retention is defined
as a participating company's market share, multiplied by $10 billion, with respect to insured
losses resulting from a terrorist act. The calculation changes in the event the program is
authorized for a second year; under the Senate bill, the program would last for one year
from the date of enactment. There is no requirement that the industry repay the federal
government under Senate Bill 2600. For a brief summary of the House bill (and a citation to
a chart comparing the two bills), see Statement of Cummins & Loman, supra note 67.
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Congress,76 by October 2002 the situation had changed" and the enactment
of some kind of federal backstop seemed likely.78
There are various ways the federal government could become involved
in providing terrorism coverage. One is by directly providing insurance
and totally displacing private markets. This would be similar to the
government program that protected property owners from loss from enemy
attack during World War II and to what Israel currently provides to
property owners with respect to terrorism. This approach has not received
serious consideration in the United States for the current terrorism
situation, and this is not likely to change. Once the government takes over
a particular market, private insurance mechanisms cease to exist, and it is
extremely difficult, and perhaps impossible, to restore such mechanisms
once they are dismantled. There is also the problem of the government
identifying the appropriate price for the coverage: setting the price too low,
the likely tendency in the face of political pressure, will encourage risky
behavior and increase losses to the ultimate cost of the American taxpayer.
In other words, the unavailability of coverage is not necessarily a problem
if the absence of insurance in the market correctly signals that a building
should not be constructed adjacent to a nuclear or hydroelectric power
facility or as tall as an engineering design allows. Yet this approach may
make sense where insurance markets have already ceased to function in
their entirety; where private markets are still operational, however, federal
preemption is too drastic. The resilience of private markets in responding
in recent months to terrorism cautions against displacement of private
76. See JERRY supra note 1, at 1074 (predicting that legislation would likely not be
enacted by Congress).
77. As of mid-2002, the issue was receiving the attention of editorial writers. See, e.g.,
Insuring Against Terrorism, N.Y. TIMEs, June 8, 2002, at A14:
Last fall, Congress responded energetically to the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks. But the response was incomplete. When the fog of normalcy, with
its paralyzing partisanship, again descended on Capitol Hill late last year,
Congress had not yet enacted urgently needed legislation to provide
federal help in insuring against similarly catastrophic terrorist attacks in
the future. It must do so now ....
Id.
78. See John D. McKinnon, House Leader Says Congress Will Pass Terror Insurance,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2002, at A4 (quoting Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio),
chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, and a White House spokeswoman,
regarding their confidence in the passage of terrorism insurance bill). Shortly before the
Congress adjourned for its 2002 election recess, an agreement was reached among Senate
Democrat conferees, some House Republican conferees, and White House and Treasury
staff on a compromise terrorism insurance.
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mechanisms, particularly when there is no reason to think that the markets
will not continue to evolve in ways that respond positively to the need for
coverage.
An approach to be taken more seriously would have the federal
government create a reinsurance company that would provide coverage for
terrorism risk. Private insurers would be compelled to participate in the
funding of this company, which would have the effect of pooling the
industry's risk while capping industry losses through a government
backstop. This approach would be similar to that now followed in the
United Kingdom, where in 1993 Parliament established in response to a
series of destructive IRA bombings the Pool Reinsurance Program
(commonly called "Pool Re") to provide insurance against damage caused
by terrorist attacks on industrial, commercial, and residential properties
within the British mainland.79 Insurers are responsible for the first
£100,000 of terrorism coverage, and claims exceeding £100,000 are paid
from premiums accumulated within a pool made up of insurance
companies and Lloyd's syndicates.80  If the pool is exhausted, all
participating insurers may be required to contribute an additional ten
percent of the premiums they collected during the year; beyond this
amount, pool investment income is spent, and beyond this sum, the British
government-meaning the British taxpayer-is responsible for paying
claims, although the government has not yet been called upon to make
payments as the insurer of last resort.8 '
The reinsurance approach enjoys some support, but it also faces
substantial opposition in the United States. This approach requires the
creation of a new government regulatory entity which, once established,
will be difficult to dismantle. This entity would, among other things, set
the premium for the government reinsurance by assessing private insurers,
but critics argue that government regulators cannot do a better job of
setting these rates than private markets. To the extent the private market
has the potential to manage terrorism risk in the future, the creation of a
permanent, government-run reinsurance institution seems premature.
Another option would have the federal government share the risk along
with private entities. For example, a large deductible could be set for
insurer contributions to terrorism losses beyond which the federal
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government assumes all risk.82 A potential problem with this approach is
that because the government is responsible for one hundred percent of all
losses above a certain level, insurers and risk managers have little incentive
to constrain losses once they rise above the deductible. Thus, the challenge
of crafting this approach involves designing a system that requires insurer
participation in compensating loss-i.e., that makes insurers bear an
appropriate share of the risk-without placing disincentives on the creation
of terrorism coverage.83 The advantage of this approach is that it can be
adjusted or dismantled as private markets improve their ability to
underwrite terrorism coverage and manage terrorism risk. This, in general
terms, is the approach that is likely to emerge from the ongoing efforts in
Congress to create a federal backstop.
In a sense, the emerging consensus on the approach to a government
backstop acknowledges the opposing, yet simultaneously correct answers
to the questions posed above about how the world generally and the
insurance world specifically have changed as a result of 9/11. On the one
hand, private markets have demonstrated considerable resiliency in the
aftermath of 9/11. All signs suggest that capacity continues to improve,
which means that the industry could be positioned to deal adequately with
the next event when it occurs (assuming it does not set a new upper
boundary for the size of terrorism losses-which is possible). Yet it is also
true that if the industry had been required to digest a second 9/11 -type
event in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 (or a major natural disaster of
some kind), the industry's weakened condition would have produced a
much different scenario. On top of all of this looms the possibility of a
mega-catastrophe--or a series of smaller events in close succession that
82. One question that must be answered in developing any such scheme is whether the
industry should be assessed for the purpose of reimbursing the government for payments it
makes. Of course, if the industry is subject to assessment, the industry still bears the risk,
but payments are made relative to a terrorism incident ex post, much like what happens in
the mutual form of insurance where premiums are kept low relative to risk and members are
assessed for losses exceeding reserves. This contrasts with the reinsurance approach, where
the government charges a premium for the reinsurance it provides, which means the industry
pays for losses ex ante by creating a pool of capital that may never be needed for terrorism
compensation. If the government provides compensation for disasters after the fact anyway,
the reinsurance approach might be advocated on the ground that the government should
collect revenue for providing this service. Assessing the industry for payments made under
the "deductible approach" also serves a revenue collection function, but this occurs exposte.
83. Gron and Sykes argue that S.B. 2600 misses in the mark in this regard because the
government would assume all losses incurred above low aggregates without charge, thereby
subsidizing insurers that have already sold policies. Gron & Sykes, supra note 52, at 5.
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have the cumulative impact of a mega-catastrophe-which would
overwhelm the insurance industry.
All of this suggests the desirability of a limited role for the federal
government: helping underwrite the portion of the terrorism risk that is
beyond the industry's capacity while leaving plenty of room for private
markets to function and to develop capacity for smaller losses. This kind
of limited backstop would cap the industry's losses, thereby making
explicit what is already the commonly assumed, unstated premise: if a
mega-catastrophe were to occur, the government would provide disaster
assistance exposte.84 But by making the informal understanding explicit ex
ante, the federal government would play a useful role in facilitating a
market for affordable coverage. 5
A UTHOR'S NOTE: As this article was going to press, Congress enacted and
President Bush signed into law The Terrorism Insurance Risk Act of
2002.86 The general framework of the Act sets a large deductible for
insurer contributions to terrorism losses beyond which the federal
government assumes most of the risk. In 2003, the federal government
would pay for ninety percent of losses exceeding $10 billion (rising to $15
billion in 2005). In addition, no insurer would receive assistance until it
has paid what is essentially a deductible based on a percentage of its total
premiums (seven percent in 2003, rising to fifteen percent in 2005). The
federal government's liability is capped at $100 billion a year.
84. See id. at 4-5 (noting the federal aid to New York City following 9/11 is currently
authorized at $25 billion; that a compensation fund has been established for victims; and
that federal emergency assistance is routinely provided for all major natural disasters). As
Gron and Sykes point out, the question can be framed as whether the government should
shift from exposte disaster relief efforts to ex ante insurance coverage. See id. at 22-23.
85. This view is consistent with the one urged by Professor Jeffrey Stempel, who
counsels restraint with respect to establishing permanent programs until the situation is
better understood but does not oppose a short-term program to preserve coverage. See
Stempel, supra note 22, at 880-82. This view is inconsistent with that urged by Professors
Gron and Sykes, who argue that "practical considerations may undermine any gains from
temporary government participation as an insurer or reinsurer," capacity problems typically
self-correct with time, governmental programs often live past their usefulness, government
is incapable of improving on the markets' pricing, political pressures to retain government-
subsidized insurance make such programs impossible to terminate, and the development of
private insurance is deterred. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 52, at 19-20. Ultimately, how
one assesses the opposing view turns on whether one believes that government is capable of
creating short-run gains without establishing permanent institutions that disrupt markets and
cause harms in the long-run; Gron and Sykes do not think this is possible.
86. Pub. L. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 (Nov. 26, 2002).
[Vol. 9:1
